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INTRODUCfrON 
Faced with a gross malapportionment and a failure of the legislature to make 
adequate reapportionment， the American courts decided to intervene. Insisting on 
the equality in worth or effectiveness of each vote， they began to require the now 
famous one-man-one-vote principle under the name of the Constitution. The 
Japanese courts， furnished with a power of judicial review similar to what is 
exercised by the American courts and confronted with the same problem， decided 
to follow this American track. Nevertheless， the Japanese courts have reached a 
conclusion quite different from the one the American counterparts have reached. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine these reapportionment cases in Japan 
and to consider what have caused these differences. In Chapter 1 this Article wil 
explain how the Japanese Constitution guarantees the right to vote and how that 
right is actuaIly effectuated in the current election system. In Chapter I it wil 
examine the reapportionment cases in Japan. And finally， in Chapter 11， this 
Article will attempt to consider the differences between the Japanese and American 
reapportionment cases. Before turning to the examination of the Japanese 
reapportionment cases， a brief survey of the American reapportionment cases is 
offered in prelude. 
PRELUDE - THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASεS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. The Constitution， the Right to Vote， and the Election System 
Even in the United States， the right to vote was not accorded a special judicial 
solicitude from the start. The original Constitution itself did not explicitly provide 
for the right to vote. It only stipulated that the House of Representatives “shall be 
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several 
States" (Article 1， Section 2) and that "Representatives... shall be apportioned 
among the several States... according to their respective Numbers， which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons... three fifth of al other 
Persons." As to the Senate， initially two Senators were chosen by the legislature of 
each state (Article 1， Section 3). And the Constitution relegated the election 
matters primarily to each state by stating that“[t]he Times， Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives， shall be prescribed in each 
State by the legislature thereof" (Article 1， Section 4). With respect to state 
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legislators， the original Constitution nowhere required even the popular election， 
except in an ambiguous mandate that "[t]he United States sl叫1guarantee to every 
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government" (Article IV， Section 4). 
It was only after the ratifications of the Civil War Amendments that the textual 
basis for a later development was firmly established. The Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited the states from deriying to any person the equal protection of the laws. It 
also changed apportionment methods by providing that “Representatives shall be 
apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers， 
counting the whole number of persons in each State." The Fifteenth Amendment 
then declared that the "right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race， color， 
or previous condition .of servitude." Thereafter the Seventeenth Amendment 
altered the method for electing Senators by requiring the election by the people and 
finally the Nineteenth Amendment prohibited a denial or abridgment of the right to 
vote on account of sex. 
It is hence abundantly clear that no discrimination based on above stated 
grounds is permitted regarding the right to vote. Yet the United States Constitution 
lacks any textual provision which guarantees the right to vote itself. As a result， the 
Supreme Court intimated that the Constitution did not confer upon anybody the 
right of suffrage. 1 In other words， the right to vote was not regarded as an individual 
constitutional right. 2 The history of the extension of the right to vote was hence 
accomplished by constitutional amendments and by congressional legislation such 
as the Voting Rights Act， and not by the courts. Moreover， itsoverriding concern 
focused on the extension of franchise， not on the equal worth or effectiveness of 
each vote.3 
B. The Reapportionment Cases in the United States 
At first， the United States Supreme Court was reluctant to intervene into 
malapportionment. In a highly divided and ambiguous decision in Colegroveν. 
Green，4 itsuggested that apportionment was relegated exclusively to the legislature. 
The Court thereafter consistently dismissed any challenges to malapportionment 
1. See， e.g.、Minorv‘ Happersett， 21 Wall. 162， 22 L.E. 627 (1875) 
2. See Kirby， Jr， The Constitutional Right to Vote， 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 995， 996-1003 (1970); Padilla & 
Gross宅 ludicialPower and Reapportionment， 15 IDAHO L. REV. 263 (1979) 
3. See Casper， Apportionment and the Right to Vote: Standard o[ ludicial Scrutiny、1973SUP. CT. REV. 1， 
4-5. 
4. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) 
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and affirmed lower court decisions which had rejected these claims， thus implying 
that apportionment was a non-justiciable "political question."S In 1962ヲhowever，
the Supreme Court decided to set aside these jurisdictional barriers. In the 
landmark decision of Baker v. Carr，6 the Court for the first time admitted that the 
federal courts had proper subject matter jurisdiction over a reapportionment suit 
and that plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality of malapportionment had 
standing. Moreover， itrejected the argument that apportionment was a non-
justiciable “political question" and reversed in effect its earlier position. 
Once the jurisdictional barriers had been set aside， itwas not unpredictable that 
the Court began to redress existing gross inequality among the districts. Only one 
year later， the Court， inGray v. Sanders，1 struckdown the county unit system in a 
primary election for state-wide offices as unconstitutional because it was a weighted 
voting system whereby rural votes were weighted hea吋erthan urban votes. The 
Court stated the foundation of its decision and hence its later reapportionment 
decisions as follows: 
The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence， to 
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address， to the Fifteenth， Seventeenth， and Nineteenth 
Amendments can mean only one thing - one person， one vote.8 
In Wesberry v. Sanders，9 the Court applied this same philosophy to congres-
sional elections. The Court proclaimed that “[n]o right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws.... 
Other rights， even the most basic， are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. ，10 
“To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another，" the Court 
continued， referring to Article 1， Section 2， "would not only run counter to our 
fundamental ideas of democratic government， itwould cast aside the principle of a 
House of Representatives elected ‘by the People'.・・・，，]]Thus it concluded that "as 
nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as 
much as another's.，]2 
5. See， e.g.， Cook v. Fortson、329U.S. 675 (1946). See also MacDougall v. Green， 335 U.S. 281 (1948). 
However句inGomillion v. Lightfot， 364 U.S. 339 (1960)， the Court acknowledged justiciability of a chalenge 
to racial gerrymandering， relying upon the Fiftenth Amendment. 
6. 369 U .S. 186 (1962). 
7. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
8. fd. at 381. 
9. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
10. fd. at 17 
11. fd. at 8. 
12. Id. at 7-8. 
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The Supreme Court reiterated the same one-man-one-vote principle in 
Reynolds v. Sims13 for state legislative apportionment in the name of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There， the Court established 
that，“as a basic constitutional standard， the Equal Protection Clause requires that 
the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a 
population basis.，14 The Court proclaimed: 
Legislators represent people， not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters， 
not farms or cities or economic Interests. As long as ours Is. a representative form of 
government， and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected 
directly by and directly representative of the people， the right to elect legislators in a 
free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.15 
Insisting that "each citizen have an equalIy effective voice in the election of 
members of his state legislature，"16 the Court held that "the Equal Protection 
C1ause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation. by al voters in the 
election of state legislators. Diluting the weight of votes because of place of 
residence impairs basic constitutional rights." 17 The Court then turned to specific 
criteria to be employed. 10 Reynolds， the Court， while conceding that“[m]athema-
tical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement，" 
declared that“the Equal Protection C1ause requires that a State make an honest 
and good faith effort to construct districts， inboth houses of its legislature， asnearly 
of equal population as is practicable." 18 But it indicated a wilIingness to tolerate 
more departures from the one-man-one-vote principle with respect to state 
legislative apportionment: 
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate 
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational st註tepolicy， some 
deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with 
respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a 
bicameral state legislature.19 
Thus， the Supreme Court made it clear that the court would employ two different 
criteria for congressional apportionment and state legislative apportionment. 
13.377 U.S. 533 (1964) 
14. Id. at 568 
15. Id. at 562. 
16. Id. at 565. 
17. Id. at 566. 
18. Id. at 577. 
19. Id. at 579. 
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The Court has continued to apply the rigid formula derived from Article 1， 
Section 2， in congressional apportionment. In Wesberry， a maximum population 
variance of roughly l-to-3 was held unconstitutionaL In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler，20 
the Court rejected a state's argument that“there is a fixed numerical or percentage 
population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy 
without question the ‘as nearly as practicable' standard. ，21 Insisting that this 
standard "requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise 
mathematical equality，'必 itheld a maximum population variance of 5.97%/ 
l-to-1.06 (total percentage deviation/ maximum population-variance ratio) uncon時
stitutionaL The Court further invalidated maximum population variances of 13.1 %/ 
l-to-1.1423 and 4.13%/ l-to-1.04.24 The Court demands "absolute equaIity."25 In 
1983， the Court in Karcher v. Daggetr26 upheld a district court decision which had 
found a maximum population variance of 0.6984%/ 1-to-1.007 not to be 
unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equaIity. 
Although the Court is not so demanding with respect to state Iegislative 
apportionment， itstiI requires relatively strict population equality under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Reynolds， maximum 
population variances of l-to司41for the election of Senators and l-to-16 for the 
election of Representatives were held to be unconstitutionaL Yet the more 
important Iesson of this decision was that the Court took quite a narrow view of 
permissible justifications for deviations and that it insisted on the population 
equality principle for both houses of a bicameral state legislature. On the same day， 
the Court also found several other state legislative malapportionments to be 
unconstitutional: maximum population variances of l-to-2.4 for the election of 
Senators and l-to-l1.9 for the election of Assembly members，27 maximum 
population variances of l-to-32 for the election of Senators and l-to-12 for the 
election of DeIegates，2H maximum population variances of l-to-2.65 for the election 
of Senators and l-to-4.36 for the election of Delegates，29 maximum population 
variances of 1・to-15for the election of Senators and 1ぺ0-12for the election of 
20.394 U.S. 526 (1969) 
21. /d. at 530. 
22. /d. at 530-31. 
23. Wells v. Rockefeller、394U.S. 542 (1969). 
24. White v. Weiser. 412 U.S. 783 (1973). 
25. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler， 394 U.S. 526、531(1969) 
26. 462 U.S. 725 (1983) 
27. WMCA、Inc.V‘ Lomenz口、 377U.S. 63 (1964). 
28. Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes， 377 U.S. 656 (1964). 
29. Oavis v. Mann， 37 U.S. 678 (1964)ー
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Representatives，30 and maximum population variances of 1-to-3.6 for the election 
of Senators and 1-to-1.7 for the election of Representatives.31 However， the Court 
began to tolerate minor deviations in the 1970's. In Abαte v. Mundt，32 the Court 
upheld a maximum population variance of 11.9%I1-to-1.125 for the County Board 
of Supervisors election based on the town boundary， emphasizing the long history 
of connection between town and county in that particular county. Thereafter， the 
Court upheld a maximum population variance of 16.4%I1-to-1.18，33 maximum 
population variances of 1.81 %11・to-1.018，and 7.83%/1ぺ0-1.082，34and a maximum 
population variance of 9.9σ%11ぺ0-1.103.35These decisions. insisted that a plaintiff 
show substantial deviations in orderto make out a prima facie violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that only when a plaintiff succeeds in 
showing more than 10% deviations， must the state carry the burden of justifying 
deviations by legitimate state interests.36 
C. Problems at Issue in the Reapportionment C回目
In order to intervene into the malapportionment problem， the United States 
Supreme Court had to set aside two chief jurisdictional barriers to reapportionment 
suits: the standing requirement and the “political question" doctrine. 
In deriving the population equality principle， the Court did not hold that 
malapportionment is an infringement of the right to vote. Indeed the Court has not 
squarelyheld thus far that the right to vote is a cοnstitutional right. The textuaJ 
basis for the reapportionment cases are， therefore， Article 1， Section 2， for 
congressional elections and the Equal Protection Clause for state elections. In other 
words， for congressional elections population equality is not a matter of 
constitutionaJ right and for state legislative elections population equality is a 
matter of equal protection. 
30. Roman v. Sincock， 377 U.S. 695 (1964) 
31. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Ass巴mbly，377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
32. 4ωU.S. 182 (1971) 
33. Mahan v. Howell， 410 U.S. 315 (1973)ー
34. Gaffney v. Cummings， 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
35. White v. Regester， 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
36. On the other hand、theCourt has showed a somewhat different attitude to明日rda court-ordered 
reapportionment plan. Thus， when the c沼口stitutionalityof court.devised plans were attacl∞d、theCourt struck 
do哨 na maximum population variance of 20. 14%/I-to-1.23 in Chapman v. Meier， 420 U.S. 1 (1975)， and 
maximum population variances of 16.5%I1-to-1.18 for the election of Senators and 19.3%/I-to-1.21 for the 
election of Ho唱semembers in Connor v. Finch， 431 U.S. 407 (1977). The Court， inFinch， stating that these 
deviations“substantially exceed the‘under田10%'deviations the Court has previously considered to be of prima 
facie constitutional validity only in the context of legislatively enacted apportionments，'、 id.at 418， concluded 
that such “substantial deviations from population eqむalitysimply cannot be tolerated in a court-ordered plan， in
the absence of some cοmpelling justification." id. at 417 
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The Court's reliance on two different textual sources has resulted in a 
bifurcated analysis of the malapportionment issues. Although the Court demands 
population equality and one-man司one-voteprinciple for both congressional and 
state legislative apportionments， ithas adopted different standards in determining 
the constitutionality of malapportionment: an absolute equality standard derived 
from Article 1， Section 2， for the congressional apportionment and a somewhat 
flexible substantial equality standard derived from the Equal Protection Clause for 
the state legislative apportionment. 
Once the judicial standard for reapportionment is established， there has been 
no major trouble for the American courts in deciding reapportionment cases. 
Because almost al reapportionment suits are brought for declaratory judgment and 
an injunction， or both， it is natural for the courts to look to a maximum population 
variance and to judge its constitutionality.37 ln other words， the courts always look 
the entire apportionment scheme and decide whether it is constitutional. Despite 
some opposing views that judicial invalidation of the apportionment statute should 
be avoided since it makes the chosen legislature wholly illegitimate， ithas been 
generally believed that such views are unfounded.38 Accordingly， American courts 
usually declare the unconstitutionality of the apportionment statute and enjoin its 
enforcement in the next election. Because apportionment is a task to be assigned 
primarily to the legislature， courts are told to permit the legislature to devise and to 
submit a constitutional reapportionment plan. 39 ln certain circumstances， however， 
courts may order an election by a court-designed reapportionment plan or an 
election at large.40 Nonetheless， invalidation is far easier than devising a 
reapportionment plan which conforms to the constitutional standard. As long as the 
ultimate resolution depends on the !egislature， any remedies have serious limitsρ 
37. In Maryland Committe巴forFair Representation v. Tawes司37U.S. 656 (1964)、theCourt stated: 
Regardless of posible concesions made by the parties and the scope of the consideration of the courts 
below， inreviewing a state legislative apportionment case this Court must of necesity consider the 
chalenged scheme as a whole in determing whether the particular State司sapportionment plan， inits 
entirety， meets federal constitutional requisites. 
Id. at 673. See also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly， 37 U.S. 713，735 n.27 (1964); Auerbach， The 
Reapportionment Cases: One Person， One Vote - One Vote， One Value， 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 1、10
38. See Dixon， Apportionment Standards and ludicial Power， 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 367， 38-89 
(1ヲ63).
39. See Auerbach、supranote 37、at18. 
40. See Dixon， supra note 38， at391θ6; McKay， Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment 
and Equal Protection， 61MICH. L. REV. 645， 70-05 (1963). 
41. See Neal， Baker v. Car: Politics in Search of Law， 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 252，326-27. For the technical 
isues involved in the reapportionment cases， see Lucas， Of Ducks and Drakes: ludicial Relief in 
Reapportionment Cases， 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 401 (1963); Scanlan， Problems of Pleading， Proof and 
Persuasion in a Reapportionment Case雫 38NOTRE DAME LAWYER 415 (1963)ー
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Sometimes the legislature cannot reach an agreement or the remedial stage takes 
more than 10 years and the legislature has to reapportion again in accordance with 
the result of a subsequent decennial census.42 
It appears undeniable that owing to these reapportionment decisions the 
legislatures are forced to reapportion in accordance with the population shiftρ 
However， these cases have not been necessarily approved by commentators. As one 
commentator put it， "[p]roverbially， hard cases make bad law. Some cases are so 
hard they may make no 'law' at all. Reapportionment may be an example."44 
Practically speaking， there are three issues involved in the American reapportion-
ment cases: the appropriateness of judicial intervention， the legitimacy or textual 
basis for population equality in the right to vote， and the judicial standard. 
The first issue is whether or not the judiciary is allowed to intervene into 
malapportionment issues in the first place. It is true that“the courts have been 
called upon to act as prime movers in effecting great reforms in areas where political 
and legislative processes have failed. ，45 But it is also true that legislative inertia 
alone cannot justify judicial intervention.46 Indeed a number of commentators 
opposed to judicial intervention on the ground that the courts should not enter into 
a “political thicket." The underlying notion is that districting and apportionment 
are legislative tasks with no judicially manageable standard.47 One may further 
point out the existence of partisan political struggle beneath the surface of 
reapportionment suitS.48 Even if the judicial intervention is justified， ithas been 
insisted that sirice “legislative reapportionment is primary a matter for legislative 
consideration and determination， judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a 
legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a 
timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so.刊49
42. Ely v. Klahr， 403 U.S. 108 (1971)， iIustrates the difficulty of granting remedies. In that case， the 
district court faced with a dilemma of conducting an election c10se at hand either by a court-ordered plan (which 
had become inadequate) or by a legislatively enacted plan (which was stil inadequate). The court chose the 
le崎町 eviland ordered the election according to the unconstitutional reapportionment plan enacted by the 
legislature. 
43. Bickerstaff， Reapportionment by State Legislatures: A Guidefor the 1980's， 34 Sw. L. J. 607， 618 
(1980)ーFora rather skeptical evaluation of the political effect of reapportionment cases， see Elliot， Prometheus， 
Proteus， Pandora， and Procrustes Unbound: The Political Consequences of Reapportionment， 37 U. CHI.L. 
REV. 474 (1970). 
44. Dixon， supra note 38、at397 
45. Neal， supra note 41， at 252. 
46. Id. at 282-83. 
47. Id. at 318. See Colegrove v. Green， 328 U.S. 549， 556 (1946) (Frankfurter， J.). 
48. See Lucas， Legislatiνe Apportionment and Representative Goνernment: The M eaning of Baker v. Carr， 
61 MICH. L. REV. 711， 801 (1963). 
49. Reynolds v. Sims， 377 U.S. 533， 586 (1964). 
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The second issue is closely intertwined with the first one. It is the issue of the 
legitimacy or textual basis for requiring equality in effectiveness or worth of each 
vote or， more specifically， population equality for the right to vote. The 
one-man-one-vote principle as formulated by the Court is criticized as lacking any 
textual basis or historical support. 50 It was said that“there is nothing in [Artice 1， 
Section 2] that seems necessarily to refer to equality of districts. ，51 Commentators 
are more critical of the Court's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause. They 
criticize the “fundamental rights" branch of strict scrutiny which was employed to 
demand population equality in the reapportionment cases. The “fundamental 
rights" methodology， they claim， finds no historical or textual justification in .the 
Constitution. Apparently， the Court's message is that“the Equal Protection Clause 
confers a substantive right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other 
qualified voters. ，52 Perhaps the Court's reliance on the Equal Protection Clause 
may be a historical accident for al reapportionment questions could be framed in 
substantive due process terms as well. 53 The right to vote can be regarded as the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
malapportionment may be seen as an invasion of that constitutional right， thus 
triggering strict scrutiny. However， inthe early twentieth century the Supreme 
Court employed this substantive due process doctrine to protect liberty of contract， 
nowhereexpressly provided for in the Constitution， and invalidated various kinds 
of social and economic legislation by employing strict scrutiny. Accordingly， the 
reapportionment cases raised the issue of whether the Due Process Clause or the 
Equal Protection Clause can be read as a textual source for an unenumerated 
constitutional right and whether the right to vote can be derived from the original 
intent as manifested by the constitutional text or by inference from the structure 
and re1ationship， two main conventional sources for constitutional 
interpretation.54 
Even if the legitimacy of judicial imposition of population equality principle is 
50. See McCloskey， The Supreme Court， 1961 Term -Foreword: The Reapportionment Case， 76 HARV 
L. REV. 54 (1962) 
51. A. BlclくEL，POLlTICS AND THE WARREN COURT 193 (1965)ー
52. City of Mobile v. Bolden， 446 U.S. 55， 77 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
53. See Dixon， supra note 38， at 385-86; Neal、supranote 41， at 285. 
54. It is this“fundamental rights" approach that is the main focus of the current controversies over judicial 
review. J. ELY， DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDIC)AL REVIEW (1980). See generally S 
MATSUI， DEMOCRACY V. JUDICIAL REVIEW: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTION-
AL INTERPRETATION BY THE JUDICIARY (1986) (J.S.D. dissertation submitted to Stanford Law School). 
Although Dean Ely rejects noninterpretivism and the “fundamental rights" approach， he admits that the right 
to vote is constitutionally guaranteed since it is integral to representative democracy. 
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accepted， there stil remains a problem of standards. As many concede and as the 
Court itself made clear， the Equal Protection Clause does not require proportional 
representation as an imperative of political organization.5 Nevertheless， the Court 
has held that population equality is the most single important factor to be 
considered in reapportionment.56 The late Professor Bickel criticized the Court: 
It is thus apparent that no one， no matter how strong his attachment to the notion of 
equal votes， regards equality of representation as the single overriding objective to 
be attained in the construction of representative institutions. On reflection， we alI 
acknowledge other goals as well: stability， enhancement of the two-party system， 
representation of the loser as well as the winners， and representation also of the 
isolated and even alienated interests. That is why we now almost universally 
district， and that， sometimes， iswhy we district unevenly.57 
For those who share this view， the "absolute equality" requirement for congression-
al apportionment and the substantiaI equality requirement for state Iegislative 
apportionment do not appear to Ieave enough room for reapportionment that takes 
non-population factors into consideration. Furthermore， excessive reliance on 
population equality may be criticized as causing fragmentation of traditional 
political boundaries and as leading to gerrymandering.58 
In any event twenty years have passed since the Court began to intervene into 
malapportionment and these reapportionment cases seem to have gained an overall 
support for one reason or another.59 Some commentators even criticize the Burger 
Court's exceedingly permissive attitude toward malapportionment in state legisla-
tive elections.60 The focus of reapportionment in the United States has now shifted 
5. City of Mobile v. Bolden、446U.S. 5， 7-78 (1980) (plurality opinion). But see Note， The 
Constitutional Imperatives o[ Proportional Representation、94YALE L. J. 163 (1984). 
56. According to Justice Harlan， the Reynolds Court precluded the folowing considerations as 
ilegitimate: (1) history， (2) economic or other sorts of group interests、(3)area， (4) geographical 
considerations， (5) a desire to insure efective representation for spars巴Iysetled areas， (6) availability of aces 
of citizens to their representatives、(7)theories of bicameralism， (8)occupation， (9)an attempt to balance urban 
and rural power， and (10) the preference of a majority of voters in the state. Reynolds v. Sims， 377 U.S. 53， 
622-23 (1964) (Harlan， J雫 disenting).However， later Court decisions apparently modified this list 
57. A. BICIくEL、supranote 51， at194 
58. For aditional literature on the reapportionment cases， see， e.g.、Dixon，Legislatiνe Apportionment 
and the Federal Constitution， 27 L. & CONT. PROB. 329 (1962); Israel， On Charting a Course through the 
Mathematical Quagmire: The Future o[Baker v. Carr， 61恥1ICH.L. REV. 107 (1962); Note， Baker v. Carr and 
Legislative Apportionment: A Problem o[ Standards， 72Y ALE L. REV. 968 (1963); Dixon， The Warren Court 
Crusade [or the Holy Grail o[“One Man -One Vote"、1969SUP. CT. REV. 219. 
59. A. Cox， THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INsTRuMENT OF REFORM 
17-19， 120 (1968)ーBlltsee R. BERGER， GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (197) 
60. See Comment， The Burger Court and Reapportionment: From One Person， One Vote to One 
Corporation， Many Votes， 62GEO. L. J. 101， 105-6 (1974); Walker， Jr.， One Man-One Vote: In Plrslit o[ an 
Elusiνe ldeal， 3 HAST. CON. L. Q. 453， 473 (1976); Dovenbarger， Democracy and Distemper: An Examination 
マ!
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to issues of redistricting and dilution of the right to vote. Although the Court is stil 
reluctant to prohibit gerrymandering and multi-member districting， they are sure to 
be regarded as the next agenda for the reapportionment suits戸I
1. THE CONSTITUTION， THE RIGHT TO VOTE， 
AND THE ELECTION SYSTEM IN JAPAN 
A. The Constitution and the Right ωVote 
The Japanese Constitution of 1946 declares that the sovereign power resides 
with the people (Preamble & Article 1) and guarantees that“[t]he people have the 
inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them" (Article 15). 
There is， therefore， an explicit provision for the right to vote in Japan. 
The J apanese Constitution has several prov吋is位ionsforbidding discrimination in 
elect悶
guaranteed with regard to the election of pu凶bl凶i封比cofficials" (Article 15， Section II) 
Second is a general equal protection provision， which states that "[ a]l of the people 
are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political， economic 
or social relations because of race， creed， sex， social status or family origin" (Article 
14). Third is a special provision concerning elections which explicitly forbids 
discrimination because of "race， sex， social status， family origin， education， 
property or income" (Article 44). Nevertheless， there is no textual provision which 
mandates equal worth or effectiveness of each vote or apportionment based on 
population equality. 
B. The Election System and the Hisωry 01 Malapportionment 
The Diet， the Japanese legislative body， consists of the House of Representa-
tives and the House of Councillors. Although members of both Houses must consist 
of“elected members" and are described as“representative of al the people" 
(Article 43)， the adoption of bicameralism has been construed to allow some 
differences in character between two Houses. Thus， the term of office for the 
members of the House of Representatives is four years (Article 45)， but because of 
ofthe Sources of ludicial Distress in State Legislative Apportionment Cases， 18 IND. L. J. 885 (1985). For a more 
detailed analysis of Burger Court's philosophy in the reapportionment cases， see Martin、TheSupreme Court 
and State Legislative Reapportionment: The Retreat from Absolutism， 9 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 31 (1974); 
Baker， One Man， One Vote， and “Political Fairness" -Or， How the Burger Court Found Happiness by 
Rediscovering Reynolds v. Sims， 23 EMORY L. J. 701 (1974) 
61. See infra note 122. 
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not infrequent dissolution of the House by the Cabinet， the average term of each 
Representative is considerably shorter. In contrast， the term of office for the 
members of the House of Counci1lors is six years (Article 46) and there is no 
dissolution. Instead， the election for half the members takes place every three 
years. These differences lead to the perception that somehow the House of 
Representatives is a true representative body of the people. In contrast， the nature 
of the House of CounciI1ors remains ambiguous. 
Wide discretion to devise the election system is given to the Diet by the 
Constitution for it states that“[e ]lectoral districts， method of voting and other 
matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses shaIl be 
fixed by laws" (Article 47). According to the Public Offices Election Law， the 
current statute regulating elections， the number of Representatives is 471 and 
CounciIlors is 252. But the 2d Addendum to that Law sets the number of 
Representatives at 511“for the time being." Representatives are apportioned to 47 
Prefectures， about 130 districts (Article 13 & Annexed Figure 1). The initial 
apportionment was made according to population and the statute presupposed 
reapportionment every five years in accordance with the result of most recent 
census (id). The Law adopts multi僧memberdistricts as a principle. Therefore， each 
voter casts just one vote (Article 36) and three to five Representatives are elected in 
each district except in Amami Island where only one Representative is chosen (the 
9th Addendum). 
Prior to the 1982 amendment， among 252 Councillors， 100 were elected at large 
and 152 were apportioned to the Prefectures. (The 1982 amendment altered 
elections at large to proportional representation. Thus， the current election system 
for Councillors is a combination of election in each Prefecture and proportional 
representation.) Because half the members of CounciIlors are elected every three 
years， the number of Councillors apportioned to each Prefecture must be even， 
currently， two to eight. This has caused Iarger deviations from population equality 
in the election for CounciIlors. 
The initial apportionment was based on the 1946 census. It was just after the 
second World War and most of the people who left the city during the wartime for 
the sake of safety and food stayed in the rural areas. As in the United States， the 
subsequent growth of populati 
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Okinawa was returned from the United States， ittried to reduce inequality roughly 
to 1-to-2 by adding to the number of Representatives.62 There was no reapportion-
ment for Councillors before the 1982 amendment. The failure of the Diet to 
reapportion was not surprising since the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic 
Party benefited from this very inequality and overrepresentation in rural districts.63 
There was hence no actual prospect of reapportionment by the legislature itself. It 
was natural that the intervention by the courts was expected as much as， ormuch 
more than， in the United States. Constitutional law scholars noticed the 
development of the reapportionment cases in the United States and began urging a 
similar development in Japan. 
I. THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES INJAPAN 
A. Decisional Law Prior to 1976 
The Supreme Court， however， hesitated to intervene at first. When the 
constitutionality of malapportionment of the House of Councillors was challenged 
in 1964， the Court rejected the cIaim， stating that apportionment was relegated to 
the Diet and that the courts should not intervene except in the case of the most 
egregious inequality.64 When one lower court held in 1973 that a maximum 
population variance of 1-to-5 was far beyond a permissibly reasonable level，65 the 
Supreme Court again affirmed its earlier position and denied judicial 
intervention.66 
B. The 1976 Supreme Court Decision 
The Supreme Court finally changed its position in 1976. In this case， an e1igible 
voter in a larger population district filed a suit chaIlenging the validity of the 
62. A maximum population variance was 1-to 1.51 in April， 1950 but it grew to l-to-3.2 in 1960. Even 
though it was reduced to l-to-2.19 i日 1964because of the ame口dment，it again grew to l-to-3.22 in 1965， 
l-to-4.83 in 1970， and l-to-4.99 (eligible voters compared) in 1972. See Judgment of Nov. 7， 1983， Supreme 
Court， Grand Bench， MINSHUU vo1.37， no.9， at 1243 (Dandou， J.， dissenting). 
63. For instance， one study shows that the Liberal Democratic Party could have 60.5% of the Councillors 
elected in each Prefecture while it could gain only 39.5% of the votes ih 1977 and 63.:1% of the Councillors but 
only 43.3 votes in 1980. Matsuzawa， Sangiintihousenshutsugiin no Kokumindaihyousei to Teisuuhaibunkitei 
Goukenhanketsu， JURIST， vo1.794， at 19， 21 (1983)ー
64. Judgment of Feb. 5， 1964， Supreme Court， Grand B巴nch，MINSHUU vo1.l8 no.2， at 270. 
65. Judgment of July 31， 1973， Tokyo High Court， HANRElJIHOU vo1.709， at 3. The court， however， 
dismissed the suit， expecting corrective action by the Diet. See Tanaka， HANREI HYOURON vo1.l77， at 13 
(1973). This decision was influenced by leading constitutional scholars who traced the reapportionment cases in 
the United States and advocated similar stricter judicial review in Japan. See N. ASHIBE， KENPOU SOSHOU NO 
RIRON 195 (1973) 
66. Judgment of April 25， 1974， Supreme Court， First Petty Bench， HANRElJlHOU vo1.737， at 3. 
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election， alleging the unconstitutionality of the apportionment statute. A lower 
court applied the traditional view and held a maximum population variance of 
1-to・5to be constitutional. 67 But this time the Supreme Court disagreed and held it 
to be unconstitutional. 68 
The first issue in this case was the legal basis of the suit. The plaintiff invoked 
Article 204 of the Public Offices Election Law stipulating that: 
Any elector or candidate for public office who has complaint as to the effect of 
election... may institute a suit at the High Court，.. within thirty days of the date of 
the election concerned. 
This provision was enacted for speedy resolution of controversies regarding the 
election and， for that purpose， itgives the elector or candidate special capacity to 
file a suit as an exception to the general standing requirement. The courts can 
invalidate the election only when there is "any act in contravention of statutory 
provisions" and where “there is likelihood of affecting the results of the election" 
(Article 205). In this sense， itis said to be a citizen's action， not actionable without a 
speciallegislative authorization. And for that matter， itwas obvious that the Diet 
did not intend to include a reapportionment suit which attacks the constitutionality 
of the underlying apportionment statute itself. The Supreme Court， however， 
approved the legality of this action without hesitation. Because it was the only way 
for elector to challenge the validity of the election under the current statutory 
provisions and because “the way for correction and redress should be provided as 
possible against any governmental acts invading the fundamental rights of the 
people，"69 the Court reasoned， the suit must be entertained. 
The Supreme Court then turned to the merits.“The right to vote，" said the 
Court，“constitutes an integral part of parliamentary democracy as a fundamental 
right guaranteeing the people the opportunity to participate in government.円70
Citing Preamble and Articles 1， 15， 43， and 44， and tracing the historical 
development of equality in the right to vote， the Court stated: 
[W]hat has been pursued consistently throughout this historical development is.. 
an ideal that the people should be regarded as perfect equals as a principle 
concerning the voting in elections which constitute the most fundamental aspect of 
popular participation in government and that every difference in physical， personal， 
67. Judgment of April 30， 1974， Tokyo High Court， GYOUSHUU vol.25 no.4， at 356. 
68. Judgment of April 14， 1976， Supreme Court， Grand Bench、MINSHUUvol.30 no.3， at 223 
6ヲ.Id. at 251 (translation by author). 
70. Jd. at 242 
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or social conditions should be ignored. The equality in the right to vote， as a 
ultimate application of such an equality principle， requires not only the extension of 
franchise by abolishing restrictions placed on the eligibility of voters， but also， 
taking a step further， substantive equality in the right to vote， namely， the equal 
worth of each vote， that is， equal effectiveness of each vote to the election result.... 
As to the right to vote， the requirement of equality under the law， established by 
Article 14， Section 1， ofthe Constitution， aspires to perfect equality in the sense that 
al the people should be equal in political worth and... the Constitution should be 
properly construed to require substantive equality in the right to vote， that is， the 
equal worth of each vote.71 
“Yet，" the Court added，“ the requirement of equal worth of vote should not be 
conceived of as demanding absolute mathematical equality in effectiveness of 
each vote to the election result.，72 The Court， then， gave wide discretion to the 
Diet: 
The Constitution does not demand equality in the right to vote as a sole factor to be 
taken into consideration in the determination of election system by the Diet. The 
Diet can adopt the particular proper election system in order to accomplish fair and 
effective representation， taking into consideration other factors which it is allowed 
to consider as to the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors 
1..73 respectIvely. 
Thus， the Court formulated the following standard for deciding the constitutionality 
of malapportionment: 
[Districting and apportionment] involve quite various， complicated and delicate 
policy and technical factors. As to the extent to which each of these factors is to be 
considered and it is to be reflected in actual determination， there exists no objective 
precise standard. In the end， the question is whether the specific determination of 
the Diet can be sustained as a reasonable exercise of that discretion.... When 
[inequality in the right to vote] amounts to the level where， after taking into 
consideration various factors usually to be considered by the Diet， apportionment 
can be hardly conceived of as having reasonableness in general， itshould be 
presumed to be exceeding the limits on reasonable discretion of the Diet and， 
absent a showing of special reasons to justify this degree of inequality， ithas to be 
held to be unconstitutional. 74 
In the case before the Court， a maximum population variance was 21O%/1-to-5 
at the time of the 1972 election. The Court thought that this could no longer be 
sustained as reasonable. Even if the deviation “amounts to a degree to which it 
71. Id. at 242-43. 
72. Id. at 243. 
73. ld. at 244. 
74. ld. at 247. 
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contravenes the requirement of equality in the right to vote，" the Court was stil 
reluctant to declare it unconstitutional too hastily， since “apportionment provision 
involved should not be declared unconstitutional merely because of this fact alone. 
Only when the corrective action required by the Constitution considering the 
population shift is not undertaken during the reasonable period， malapportionment 
should be condemned to be unconstitutional.刊行 In this case， the Diet failed to 
reapportion despite gross inequality beyond the reasonable level for over eight 
years without any special justifications. Accordingly， the Court concluded that the 
apportionment provision involved was unconstitutional at the time of the election. 
The Court then faced difficult choices. First， ithad to determine whether 
apportionment as a whole or apportionment in a particular district should be held 
unconstitutional. Since the suit is filed attacking the validity of the election in a 
particular district， itmay be more natural for the Court to decide upon the 
constitutionality of malapportionment in that particular district. The Court thought， 
however， that apportionment constituted an interrelated integral unity and was 
unseverable. It thus held the whole apportionment to be unconstitutional. The 
Court then had to decide whether or not the election should be invalidated. The 
invalidation of the election， the Court reasoned， would disqualify not only 
Representatives chosen in malapportioned districts but also al elected Representa-
tives. It deprives the underrepresented districts of Representatives in the Diet， casts 
serious doubt about the activities taken by the Diet thus far and makes it impossible 
to reapportion. The Court， in declining such a course， stated: 
As a principle， a statute repugnant to the Constitution is invalid ab initio and the 
effect of the action based on it should also be denied. However， itis so only because 
such a construction is ordinarily the b巴stway to prevent or to remedy 
unconstitutional consequences. When such a construction. does not necessarily 
contribute to the prevention or correction of unconstitutional consequences and 
produces highly inadequate consequences in relation to the Constitution，... 
naturally， a different， reasonable construction based on a universal perspective 
must be adopted.76 
The Court invoked Article 31， Section 1， of the Administrative Cases Litigation Act 
which allows the judiciary to uphold the illegal administrative action when its 
invalidation would cause serious threat to public welfare. Although this provision 
was supposed to apply to a revocation action which seeks the judicial revocation of 
75. Id. at 248-49 
76. Id. at 250. 
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administrative actions under the Administrative Cases Litigation Act and was not 
applicable to an Article 204 action under the Public Office Election Law， the Court 
reasoned that Article 31 rested upon a general principle of law not confined to 
revocation of administrative action. The Court， therefore， refrained from invalidat憎
ing the election and held that it was valid despite the unconstitutionality of the 
apportionment provision. The suit was hence dismissed. 
仁 A戸ermαthof the 1976 Decision:・Electionsof Representatives 
The Diet has refused to take any action， insisting that unconstitutional 
inequality condemned by the Supreme Court was remedied by the 1975 
amendment. This reapportionment amendment was enacted before the Court 
decision and， by adding 20 Representatives， itmanaged to reduce a maximum 
population variance roughly to 1-to-2.92.77 Population variance has become even 
larger， however， due to the subsequent growth and shift of population. And lower 
courts had to struggle with the vague standard left by the Supreme Court. Thus， 
while one court upheld the deviation of 1-to-1.3 from the average population in a 
particular district， stating that the court could only judge the constitutionality of the 
apportionment in that district，78 only two days later， a different panel of the same 
court held a maximum population variance of 1-to-3.5 to be unconstitutiona1.79 This 
incident showed the ambiguous nature of reasonableness standard adopted by the 
Supreme Court. 80 Later this same lower court went on to proclaim the demand of 
formalistic equality in the right to vote and declared any deviations over a maximum 
、populationvariance of 1-to-2 to be unconstitutional. 81 Other courts have since held 
maximum population variances of 1-to-3.1682 and 1-to-3.9583 both to be unconstitu-
tional. 
On November 1983， the Court handed down another decision involving the 
77. See Nonaka， Giinteisuusaiban no Saikin 110 Doukou， JURIST vo1.680， at 78， 78-79 (1978). 
78. Judgment of Sept‘11， 1980， Tokyo High Court， HANRElJlHOU vo1.902， at 24 
79. Judgment of Sept. 13， 1980， Tokyo High Court， HANRElJlHOU vo1.902， at 34 
80. See Nonaka， supra note 77， at 78; I. Satou， Giinteisuuhukil1kou ni kanswu Hutatsu no Haiiketsu， 
HOUGAKU SEMINAR vo1.1979 No.5， at20; Kubota， HANREl HYOURON vo1.240， at6 (1979); Shimizu， SHOUWA 
53 NENDO ZYUUYOUHANREI KAISETSU 12; Ohmiya， 2 KENPOUHANREI HYAKUSEN 262 (1980). 
81. Judgment of Dec. 23， 1980， Tokyo High Court， HANRElJIHOU vol. 984， at26. See T.Abe， Tokyo 
KOllsai“Giinteisllllhaibunhiritsll Ichi tai Ni Ikenhanketsll" no Igi to Mondaiten， JURIST vo1.735， at85 (1981); 
Yamamoto， Teislluzeseisaiban， HOUGAKU KYOUSHITSU vol.6， at 55 (1981); Mukai， Giinteisuuzeseisaiban， 
TEIKYO HOUGAKU vo1.13 no.1， at197 (1982); Ashib巴， SHOUWA 55 NENDO ZYUUYOUHANREI KAISETSU 9; 
Nagao， HANREI HYOURON vol.269， at 11 (1981) 
82. Judgment of Oct. 22， 1981， Sapporo District Court， HANRElJIHOU vol.l021， at 25 
83. Judgment of Feb. 17， 1982， Osaka: High Court， HANRElJlHOU vol.l032， at 19. 
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election of Representatives. 84 In appeals from two lower court decisions which had 
held the apportionment statute as applied to the 1980 election unconstitutional， the 
Court affirmed the constitutional requirement of population equality in the right to 
vote and held a maximum population variance of 1-to-3.94 to be far beyond the 
reasonable level. Nonetheless， the eight member majority did not condemn it as 
unconstitutional. For the majority， unconstitutional inequality condemned by its 
earlier decision was corrected by the 1975 amendment and it was hard to tel when 
the apportionment became unreasonable. Moreover， the majority thought it 
improper to reapportion too frequently because it would impair the stability of 
politics. Thus， the Court concluded that less than 4 years was stil too early to 
condemn the unreasonable apportionment as unconstitutional. 
The majority of the Court warned the Diet that "it is highly desirable to amend 
as soon as possible. ，85 Yet the Court's warning could not make the Diet enact a 
reapportionment amendment. The general election was held in 1983 in accordance 
with the apportionment provision which was held by the Supreme Court to be far 
beyond reasonable limits imposed by the Constitution. A maximum population 
variance grew to 1-to-4.40 from 1-to田.3.94.Eligible voters in underrepresented 
districts immediately filed suits attacking the constitutionality of the election. In al 
of the High Court decisions handed down regarding this election， the apportion-
ment provision was held to be unconstitutiona1.86 Finally， on July 17， 1985， the 
Supreme Court， inperhaps the most significant decision since its 1976 decision， 
upheld two of these High Court decisions.87 The Court first reaffirmed Article 14's 
mandate for equal worth or effectiveness of each vote. The Court then decided that 
a maximum population variance of 1-to-4.40 was beyond what is generally believed 
to be reasonable by taking al factors into consideration and that the Diet failed to 
remedy this gross inequality during the reasonable period. It thus held the current 
84. Judgrnent of Nov. 7， 1983， Suprerne Court， Grand Bench， MINSHUU vo1.37， no.9， at1243 
85. The seven Judges dissented. Judge Fuzisaki denied the legality of the lawsuit and refused to dernand 
the population equality principle. Six others thought that a rnaxirnurn population variance of 1-to-3.94 was 
unconstitutional at the tirne of the election 
86. Judgrnent of Sept. 28， 1984， Hiroshirna High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.537， at92; Judgrnent of Oct. 
19， 1984， Tokyo High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.537， at92; Judgrnent of Nov. 27， 1984， Osaka High Court， 
HANREI TIMES 541， at99; Judgrnent of Nov. 29， 1984， Osaka High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.541， at99; 
Judgrnent of Nov. 30， 1984， Osaka High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.541， at99; Judgrnent of Nov. 30， 1984， 
Osaka High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.541， at99 (a cornpanion case); Judgment of Dec. 7， 1984， Osaka High 
Court， HANREI TIMES vol.541， at99; Judgrnent of Dec. 25， 1984， Sapporo High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.544， 
at 77. 
87. The Judgrnent of July 17， 1985， Suprerne Court， Grand Bench， HANREIJIHOU vo1.1l63， at3. 
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apportionment statute which was employed in the 1983 election to be unconstitu-
tional. Although the Court followed its previous position not to invalidate the 
actual election conducted under the unconstitutional apportionment statute， this 
was the first time in the history of the reapportionment cases that the Court held the 
existing apportionment scheme to be unconstitutional. 8 
D. A戸ermathof the 1976 Decision:・ Electionsof Councillors 
With respect to the election of Councillors， the courts are more reluctant to 
require population equality. The courts tend to grant more discretion .to the Diet in 
devising a representation basis different from population equality and， therefore， 'to
tolerate more deviations than in the election of Representatives. Even after the 
1976 decision， one lower court held a maximum population variance of 1-to-5.26 
constitutiona189 and another court also upheld this same variance because it was too 
early to condemn the malapportionment as unconstitutional. 90 One court admitted 
that a “reverse apportionment phenomenon，" where a less populous district had 
more Councillors than a more populous district， was hardly sustainable but decided 
to allow more time to the Diet.91 
The Supreme Courtapproved this permissive attitude on April， 1983.92 The 
Court admitted the necessity of equality in the right to vote and the population 
equality requirement even in apportionment of Councillors. Nevertheless， it
concludedthat a maximum population variance of 1-to柚5.26did not reach to the 
egregious level of raising the question of unconstitutionality.93 
II. A COMMENT ON THE REAPPORTIONMENT CASES IN JAPAN 
Ten years have passed since the Japanese Court first intervened into 
malapportionment issues. The judicial doctrines in the reapportionment cases 
8. Five Judges， intwo separate concuring opinions， implied the posibility that the Court would hold the 
election invalid if the Diet would employ the curent unconstitutional apportionment provision without 
corective action. Judge Taniguchi disented and proposed to invalidate the elections in only grosly 
underrepresented and overrepresented districts. 
89. Judgment of Feb. 28， 1979， Osaka High Court， HANREIJlHOU vol.923， at30 
90. Judgment of June 13， 1979， Tokyo High Court， HANREIJlHOU vo1.93， at16 
91. Judgment of Sept. 28， 1982， Osaka High Court， HANRElJIHOU vol.l070， at19. 
92. Judgment of April 27， 1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench， MINSHUU vo1.37，日0.3，at 345. 
93. Judge Taniguchi thought a maximum population variance of 1-to-5.26 beyond permisible limits even 
though the population equality requirement must be attemIated with respect to elections of Councilors， 
Nevertheless， heconcluded that it was to early for the Court to condemn itas unconstitutional. Judge Dandou 
E巴achedthe same conclusion the Court had reached in its 1976 decision concerning the elections of 
Representatives. 
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appear to be fairly well settled.94 Since the reapportionment cases are the only 
decisions of the J apanese Court which have held the Acts of the Diet unconstitu-
tional in areas closely connected with politics， they deserve close scrutiny. In this 
Chapter， 1 will examine the Japanese Court's view on each issue involved in the 
reapportionment cases in light of the commentators' arguments and explore the 
implications of these decisions in Japanese constitutional law. 
A. Justiciability 
As to the admissibility of reapportionment suits， some dissenting voices 
notwithstanding，95 the 1976 Supreme Court decision's view has been followed by 
later decisions and lower courts as well. It seems to have a majority support also 
from commentators.96 It is remarkable that the Court was willing to grant redress by 
employing an “equitable" construction of a statute. Since the Japanese courts are 
extremely reluctant to intervene without express statutory authorization， itwas 
natural for the plaintiffs to invoke some statutory basis for their claims， even if it is a 
far-fetched one. Moreover， the invocation of Article 204 produced some strategic 
benefits for the plaintiffs. First， since the action attacking the validity of the election 
based on Article 204 of the Public Offices Election Law was authorized by the Diet， 
the Court did not have to worry seriously about the separation of powers argument 
or the political question doctrine against justiciability. And second， since it was 
regarded as a citizen's action which can be filed without satisfying the ordinary 
94. The Tokyo High Court applied the population equality principle to municipal legislative apportion 
ment of members of the Tokyo Metropolitan Congress and held that a maximum population variance of 
1-to・7.45violated Article 15， Section 7 of the Public Offices Election Law which required the population 
e司ualityprinciple. Judgment of July， 25， 1983， Tokyo High Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.500， at97. See also 
Judgment of Aug. 7， 1983， Tokyo High Court， HANREI TIMES vol. 531， at80. The Supreme Court upheld the 
Tokyo High Court decision. Judgment of May 17ヲ 1984，Supreme Court， First Petty Bench， MINSHUU vol. 38 
No.7， at 721. The Tokyo Metropolitan Congress amended the apportionment ordinance but the Tokyo High 
Court held a maximum pop臼lationvariance of 1-to-3.4 stil illegal. Judgment of Feb. 26， 1ヲ86，Tokyo High 
Court， ASAHI SHINBUN Feb. 27， 1986 
95. Only one Judge， Judge Amano， disagreed with the majority on this justiciability issue in the 1976 
decision. In two cases handed down in 1983、JudgeFuzisaki denied justiciability. See also Taguchi， Giinteisuu 
no Hukinkouzeseiω Senkyososhou， KEIOU DAIGAKU HOUGAKU KENKYUU vol.50 no.1， at77 (1977); 
Hayashi， Kokkaigiin no Senkyokubetsuteisuu no Hukinkoumondai ni taisuru kangaekata， HOURITSU NO HIROBA 
vol.34 noムat4 (1981); Ono， Giinte山 uhaibunsoshouwo meguru Hanrei no Doukou to Mondaiten， HOURITSU 
NO HIROBA vol.34 no.5， at 11， 15 (1981); Hiraga， Hitori Ippyou: Ippyou Douchi (1)-σ)， HANREIJIHOU 
vo1.1024， at3， vo1.1026， at3， vo1.1028，at 3宅 voi.1929，at 3， vo1.1031， at3 (1983). Judge Kishi suggested a 
revocation suit against administrative action as an alternative. See Hamada，日OUGAKUKYOUKAI ZASSHI 
vol.95 no.1， at 219， 225-26 (1978). 
96. See Ashibe， Giinteisuuhaibunkiteiikenhanketsu no Igi to Mondaiten， JURIST vo1.617， at 36， 37-38 
(1976); Wada， Shuugiingiinteisuu Ikenhanketsu to sono Mondaiten， HANRE口IHOUvol.811 ， at 3， 6 (1976)， 
See also Y.HIGUCHI， SIHOU NO SEKKYOKUSEI TO SHOUKYOKUSEI 100-01 (1978); Y. Abe， Giinteisuル
haibunkitei Ikenhanketsu ni okeru Soshouhouzyou no Ronten， JURIST vo1.617， 55， 58 (1976). 
38 OSAKA UNJVERSJTY LAW REVJEW [No. 33: 17 
standing requirement， itwas natural that the Court did not inquire into the standing 
issue. In shortヲ theJapanese Court did not have to decide Baker v. Carr. 
Nonetheless， itmust be admitted that the invocation of Article 204 left the 
status of the right to vote unclear. For this statutory cause of action is generally 
regarded as a citizen's action， not as an action for the vindication of an individual 
right. Obviouly the prevailing view is premised on the belief that the right to vote is 
not an individual constitutional right or that malapportionment is not an invasion of 
the right to vote. The right to vote has been regarded as rather an obligation of the 
people or at most as an official function of the people as a whole. Even though 
leading commentators came to regard the right to vote as an individual 
constitutional right， they have not regarded it as a basis for claiming the population 
equality principle.97 As stated below， the view that the reapportionment suits are 
not actions fpr the vindication of individual rights prompted lower courts to dismiss 
reapportionment suits seeking injunction and declaratory remedies as not justici-
able， because they are not suits for the vindication of individual right and because 
no statutory authorization for such suits can be found.98 Upon reflection， itwas 
perhaps unfortunate that the Japanese Court and commentators did not notice the 
significance of the fact that the Japanese Constitution， unlike the United States 
Constitution， has an explicit textual provision for the right to vote.99 
B. The Constitution， •the Right to Vote， and Equal Protection 
It is also noteworthy that the Japanese Supreme Court has regarded the right to 
vote as a fundamental right and required equal worth or effectiveness of one's vote 
by invoking the general equal protection provision. This view has been reaffirmed 
ever since its 1976 decision.lOO Reliance on the equal protection concept is a result 
97. See general，仇 K.HASHIMOTO，NIHONKOKUKENPOU 413 (1980); K.SATOU， KENPOU 434 (1981). 
98. See infra notes 116-17. 
99. The characterization of the reapportionment suits as citizen's suits is inconsistent with the Court's 
holding that malapportionment violates the equal protection provision. If malapportionment is a denial of the 
right to equal protection， then the reapportionment suits must be seen as suits for the vindication of one's 
constitutional right. Tanaka， Teisuuhaibunhubyoudou ni taisuru Shihoutekikyuusai， JURIST vo1.830，昌t41， 42 
(1985) 
100. Judgment of April 27， 1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench， MINSHUU vol. 37， no.3， at 345; 
Judgment of Nov. 7， 1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench， MINSHUU vo1.37， no.9， at1243. In Judgment of July 
17， 1985， the Court stated that“Article 14， Section 1， of the Constitution demands not only prohibition of 
discrimination in voter eligibility concerning the inalienable right of the people to choose members of both 
House of Representatives and House of Councillors (Article 44)， but also substantive equality in the right to 
vote， namely，巴qualeffectiveness of each vote cast for choosing the legislators， that is， equal worth of each 
vote." JudgmentofJuly， 17， 1ヲ85，Supreme Court， Grand Bench， HANRElJlHOU vol.l163， at3. Judge Fuzisaki 
stil disagrees this population equality requirement. Judgment of Nov. 7， 1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench， 
supra (Fuzisaki， J.， dissenting); Judgm巴ntof April27， 1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench， supra (Fuzisaki， J.， 
dissenting). See also Hiraga (3)， supra note 95， at 6. 
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of Japanese scholars' attempts during the 1970's to import the equal protection 
doctrine concerning the reapportionment cases in the United States to Japan. 
Under the conventional view of the Court the ordinary equal protection standard is 
one of reasonableness， similar to rationality review under the Equal Protection 
Clause in the United States. Under that standard， the demand for population 
equality in the right to vote would be transformed into a problem of mere 
reasonableness. Judge Itoh made that clear in his concurring opinion in the 1983 
Court decision involving the House of Councillors. Under the general equal 
protection analysis， he reasoned， a statute should be presurned to be constitutional， 
unless it was explicitly forbidden by Articles 14 or 44. Because malapportionment 
was a discrimination by the place of residence， he then thought， the problem was 
whether or not it was reasonable. Because this reasonableness review should be 
very deferential，101 the population equality requirement would be greatly under-
mined by deference to the Diet. Scholars have insisted， therefore， that the judiciary 
engage in more vigorous review because the right to vote is a fundamental right.102 
Although this interpretation raises serious methodological question， just similar to 
the problem which the “fundamental right" approach has posed in the United 
States， Japanese constitutional law scholars appear to have not taken the issue 
seriously. Since the Japanese Constitution explicitly provides for the right to vote it 
may be better for the Court to derive the necessity of equal effectiveness of each 
vote and the necessity of vigorous review from this provision， or maybe from its 
special characteristics in the whole structure of the Constitution， and not from the 
general equal protection provision.103 
As to the judicial standard， although the Japanese Supreme Court is likely to 
hold a maximum population variance over 1-to-3 unconstitutional， ithas never 
made clear the precise limits of malapportionment for the election of Representa司
tives. Some Judges have expressed views that a maximum population variance over 
101. Judgment of April， 27， 1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench， MINSHUU vo1.37， no.3， at345，358-61 
(Itoh， J.， concuring). He thus declined to subscribe to the prevaili時 vi巴wthat the right to vote should be 
regarded as a fundamental right always demanding strict scrutiny. 
102. See Nakamura， Giinteisuu no Hukinkou to Senkyoken no Byoudou， LAW SCHOOL vo1.52， 72， 74 
(1983) 
103. See Takahashi， Teisuuhukinkouikenhanketsu ni kansuru Zyakkan no Kousatsu， HOUGAKUSHIRIN 
vol.74 no.4， at 79， 83-84 (197). See also Tsujimura， Senkyoken no HonshitsuωSenkyogensoku， 
HITOTSUBASHI RONSHUU vol.86 noムat210，226 (1981); Y.HIGUCHI， supra note 96， at121-2; Nagao， Senkyo 
ni kansuru Kenpouzyou no Gensoku (3)， LA W SCHOOL vol.14， at95 (197); Nagao弔supranote 81， at14. 
40 OSAKA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [No. 33: 17 
1-to-2 or 1-to-3 is unconstitutional. 1似 Themajority of scholars are highly critical of 
the excessively flexible and permissive standard adopted by the Supreme Court. 
Yet qu山it匂ea few concIude t出ha従tany deviation from population equa討lit匂yおs 
unc∞on路凶凶s幻矧ti抗tut討加i泊onal.105 Leading scholarおswou叫Idrather put the burden of jus幻凶t“if布ym
deviations on the government and reject any deviations over a maximum 
population variance of 1-to-2.106 While the Diet should be allowed to consider 
non-population factors， the Court's willingness to tolerate almost everything as 
justifications for deviations from population equality is hardly acceptable.I07 
NevertheIess， the reason why a maximum population deviance over 1-to-2 is to be 
held unconstitutional is not self-evident. 108 Whereas many intuitively believe that if 
one man's vote has the worth of two votes then malapportionment exceeds the 
constitutional limits， there are some commentators who suggest the German 
approach which would require reapportionment if one district has 33.3% more or 
les population than the average.109 
The same critique is levied at the Court's approval of greater deviations with 
respect to elections of Councillors. While the Constitution adopts bicameralism and 
therefore some kinds of difference should be allowed for elections of Councillors， 
many commentators cIaim that CouncilIors are stil representative of al the people 
and the Constitution guarantees the right to vote. Accordingly， they insist， 
deviations from population equality are no les questionable as they are with 
respect to elections of Representatives.1 10 
104. In Judgment of Nov. 7， 1983， Judge Nakamura stated that a maximum population variance over 
l-to-3 is unconstitutional、JudgeDandou took the view that a maximum population variance over l-to-2 is 
presumptively suspicious， and Judge Yokoi held a maximum population variance over l-to-2 unconstitutiona1. 
See also Judgment of Dec. 23、1980、TokyoHigh Court、HANREIJIHOUvo1.984， at 26 (a maximum population 
variance over l-to-2 unconstitutional); Judgment of Nov. 27、1984、OsakaHigh Court， HANREI TIMES vo1.541司
at 99 (a maximum population variance over l-to-3 unconstitutional). 
105. Tsujimura句 Senkyoken，in KENPOUIIANR日 NOKENKYUU 159、178-79(A.Ohsuka. et. a1. ed. 1982) 
(absolute equality). 
106. See Ashibe、supranote 96唱at43; Nonaka、supranote 77， at 84-85 (1978)噌 Hamada句supranote 95， at 
229; Yoshida、Giinteisuuno Hukinkou 10 Hou no Molo no Byoudou， inKENPOU NO HANREI 22 (3d ed. 1977); 
Chiba， MINSIIOU Hou ZASSIII vo1.76 nO.I， at 97、105(1977); Nonaka， Senkyo ni kansuru Kenpouzyo no 
GensoklムKOUHOUKENKYUUvo1.42司 at56、77(1980); K.SAγou supra note 97、at87. See also Takahashi、
Giinleisuuhaibun no Hubyoudou、in4 KENPOUG八KU98、115(Y.Okudaira ed. 1976) (presumption of 
unconstitutionality for deviadon over l-to-2) 
107. N巴gishi，Giinleisuuhaibun 10 Minshushugi、HANREITIMES vo1.561， at 13‘ 17 (1985). 
108. Id. at 20 
109. T.Abe、Giinleisuuhaibun10 Senkyo no Byoudou， in GENDAI GIKAISEIJI 126 (1977) (judge should 
examine deviations from the average districts); Abe、Ippyouno Kakusa 10 Hou no motono Byoudou， JURIST 
vo1.830、at49、53(1985) 
110. For comment， see Nonaka、SaninteisuuhukinkouGoukenhanketsu no Kenlou， HOUGAKU SEMINAR 
vo1.l983 nO.7， at 16; Takano、SangiingiinteIsuuSaikousaihanketsu ni tsuite， JURISγvo1.794， at 13 (1983); 
Matsuzawa、supranote 63; Ashibe、Sangiinteisuusoshou{() Rippouhu no Sairyolム HOUGAKUKYOUSHITSU 
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C. Problems of Remedy 
Severability and the treatment of the unconstitutional election were difficult 
problems for the Court. In its 1976 decision， the majority opinion thought the 
apportionment unseverable and hence held the whole apportionment to be 
unconstitutional. But his holding led the majority to refrain from invalidating the 
election. The minority opinion asserted that the Court should judge the 
constitutionality of apportionment in the particular district involved.ll Then， it
would not be so difficult for the Court to invalidate the election in that district. But 
this solution would produce some improper consequences pointed out by the 
majority. Taking the middle position， Judge Kishi offered an acrobatic solution. He 
would hold deviations in a particular district unconstitutional and would invalidate 
the election in that district. Nonetheless， he would allow the elected members to 
continue their activities because the unconstitutional defect could be cured by 
providing additional members to the underrepresented districts. Il2 
Judge Kishi's approach may help the Court to avoid the curious holding that the 
election was valid despite the unconstitutionality of underlying apportionment 
provision. Indeed， this holding is hard to swallow from the standpoint of the rule of 
law. 1I3 The Court's position left the unconstitutional stafuteforever intact and gave 
no room for judicial relief. But it gained support from many scholars. They attempt 
to understand it as a kind of warning decision or a prospective rulin'g.14 
Apparently， however， many Judges and commentators feel deep frustration at the 
continued failure of the Diet to correct the unconstitutional apportionment statute. 
In the 1985 Supreme Court decision，several Judges expressed some concern that 
the majority's view would leave the unconstitutional statute intact. The ideal of rule 
of law， they claimed， would require invalidation this time. 15 
vol.34， at6 (1983); Kubota， SangiInchihoukllsenshulsllgiinleisulIsoshollni laisuru Daini no Saikousai Daihoutei 
Hankelsu ni Isuite司HANREIJIHOUvol.107、at3 (I983); Nonaka， Saninleislluhllkinkoll GOllkenhankelsu ni /suite 
no Zyakkanno Kousalsll司HANREIJIHOUvol.107、at7 (1983); Tsukiji， Sangiinleisuusoshou Saikousaihanketsu 
-SOIlO Keika 10 Gaiyou， HOURITSU NO HIROBA vol.36 nO.7‘at 4 (1983); Uen口、SaikousaiHankelsu no 19i /0 
Mondaile1に HOURITSUNO H'ROBA vol.36 nO.7， at 16 (1983); Shimizu， Sangiinteisuusoshou Zyouko-
kushinhankelsu Hihyou， HOURITSU NO HIROBA vol.36 nO.7、at25 (1983); Yoshida司 Sangiinleisuusoshou
Saikousaihankelsu wo yonde， HOURITSU NO HIROBA vol.36 nO.7， at31 (1983); Yamamoto， HANREI HYOURON 
vol.却()、 at23 (1983). 
11. This is aIso a minority view among commentators. See supra note 87; T.Abe， Giinteisuu lkenhankelsu 
/0 Senkyo no Kouryoku， HOURITSUJIHOU vol.57弔 nO.1，at 51 (1985) 
112. See Y.Abe， supra note 96、at60; Kubota， supra note 80， at9. 
113. See Wada， supra note 96， at 7; Nonaka， Kenpousoshou ni okeru "Zizyou Hankelsu" no Houri， 
KANAZAWA DAIGAKU HOUBUNGAKUBU RONSHUU vo1.25， at1 (197); Nonaka， SHOUWt¥ 51 NENDO 
ZyUUYOU HANREI KAISETSU 12; Nonaka司 2GYOUSEIHOU HANREI HYAKUSEN 418 (1979)ー
114. See Ashibe， supra note 96， at46-48、50・51;Wada， supra note 96、at7. 
115. See supra note 8 
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Even if the majority's understanding is adequate， itis stil imperative to seek 
alternative remedies. Arguably， injunction would be a more appropriate remedy. 
However， the courts are reluctant to accept this kind of action. For example， when 
a plaintiff sought a declaration of the Cabinet's obligation to submit a reapportion-
ment bil to the Diet， one lower court dismissed the action， holding it not 
justiciable.16 1n an injunction suit， the lower court also dismissed it for the same 
reason.17 The only remaining remedy is a damage action against the government. 
The plaintiffs' burden is not easy， however， since they must show not only the 
unconstitutionality of inaction or neglect of the Diet to reapportion but also fault on 
the part of the legislature. Lower courts tend to reject damage actions stating that 
no fault on the part of the legislature has yet been shown.18 
The reluctance of the courts to admit injunction suits is predicated upon the 
conventional belief that the Japanese courts lack the "equitable円 powerexercised 
by the American courts. And this view was fortified by the separation of powers 
argument that injunction intrudes into the legislative and executive powers. 
Nevertheless， unsatisfied with the Court's willingness to leave the unconstitutional 
apportionment statute intact， a growing number of commentators came to argue 
that there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent the J apanese courts from 
granting injunctiverelief.1l9 Some commentators would even allow the judiciary to 
order an election based on a court-ordered reapportionment plan.120 121 
D. A Comment on the Role of the Judiciary in Japanese Society 
When we compare the developments of the American and J apanese reappor-
16. Judgment of Nov. 16， 1976， Tokyo District Court， HAREJJlHOU vo1.832， at3. 
17. Judgment of Nov. 19， 1976， Tokyo District Court， GYOUSHUU vol.27 no.1-12， at172， af'd， 
Judgment of April 25， 197， Tokyo High Court， GYOUSHUU vol.28 no.4， at 37. These cases are noted in 
Tomatsu， Giinteisuu Hukinkousoshou Hanketsu no Kentou， HOURITSU JIHOU vol.52 no.6， at20 (1980). 
18. Judgment of August 8， 197きTokyoDistrict Court， HANREIJIHOU vo1.859， at3. See also Judgment of 
Oct. 19， 1978， Tokyo District Court， HANREIJIHOU vo1.914， at29; Judgment of Nov. 30， 1981， Tokyo District 
Court， HANREIJIHOU vo1.1024， at32; Judgment of Oct. 2， 1981， Sapporo District Court， HANREIJIHOU vol 
1021， at25， These cases are noted in Yamamoto， HANREI HYOURON vo1.25， at15 (197); Nonaka， SHOUWA 
53 NENDO ZyUUYOU HANREI KAISETSU 2. 
19. K.Sato立，Kihontekijinken no Hoshou to Kyuusai (1)ρ')，日OUGAKUKYOUSHITSU vo1.5， at65， 
vo1.56， at59 (1985); Tanaka， supra note 9， at46. 
120. Takahashi， Teisuuhukinkou lkenhanketsu no Mondaiten to Kongo no Kadai， JURIST vo1.84， at21， 
29 (1985). Nevertheless， many stil believe that such an action is beyond th巴judic凶 power.Judgment of Nov. 7， 
1983， Supreme Court， Grand Bench (Yokoi， J.disenting); Abe， supra note 11， at5. 
121. For aditionaliteratures， see I.Satou， Giinteisuu Hukinkou lkenhanketsu no Mondaiten， HOUGAKU 
SEMINAR vo1.1976 no.6， at8; Ban， Giinteisuuhaibunkitei lkenhanketsu ni tsuite， HOURITSU NO HIROBA vol.29 
no.9， at43 (1976); Koshiyama， Shuugiinteisuuha伽mkiteilkensoshou ni kansuru Saikousai Daihoutei Hanketsu， 
JURIST vo1.617， at62 (1976); Yamamoto， 2 KENPOU HANREI HYAKUSEN 260 (1980). 
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tionment cases， we can find some similarities and some critical differences. Since 
the J apanese reapportionment cases have developed under the strong influence of 
American counterparts， it is interesting to note these differences. The first 
difference concerns the forms of action. The reapportionment cases in the United 
States are almost al suits for declaratory judgment and injunction， while in Japan 
they are usually suits seeking the invalidation of election already conducted. 
Japanese courts are indeed reluctant to grant injunctions or other remedies. This 
difference in the forms of action led the courts adopt different remedies. Whereas 
the American courts can declare the unconstitutionality of the apportionment 
statute and enjoin the election or they can order an election at large or an election 
based on a court-ordered reapportionment plan， the Japanese courts had to declare 
the unconstitutionality of the apportionment statute and dismiss the suits， leaving 
the election intact. The second difference concerns the constitutionallimits placed 
on malapportionment. Both American and Japanese courts hold that the principle 
of equal protection demands the population equality principle. Nonetheless， while 
American courts require absolute equality in congressional apportionment and 
substantial equality in state legislative apportionment， Japanese courts are more 
tolerant of larger deviations from population equality. 
It is arguable whether the rigid standard adopted by' American courts is indeed 
a necessary ingredient of a democratic society or is desirable from the standpoint of 
actual management. Especially if we consider the fact that reapportionment has 
remained a politically agonizing issue in many states and the fact that attempts to 
preserve party dominance over an opponent party has resulted in subtle 
gerrymandering， there may be a limit to judicial.power. But if we consider the 
critical significance of the right to vote in free democratic government， itis at least 
essential that the courts review the malapportionment with some vigorousness. 
Therefore， itmay be tempting to suggest some factors which may have contributed 
to the differences of Japanese reapportionment cases from the American， 
counterparts. 
One factor is a unique system of election districts in Japan. As previously 、
noted， the Japanese election system for the House of Represe 
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operated as purposive devices to further racial discrimination by minimizing， 
cancelling out or diluting the voting strength of racial elements in the voting 
population.122 Yet the United States Supreme Court has never held that diluting the 
voting strength of partisan minority is unconstitutional although it has occasionally 
suggested the possibility. 123 In J apan， the issue of malapportionment is entirely 
partisan. Moreover， where the voter casts only one vote and several Representa-
tives are elected in one district， under the current political demography of political 
parties， minority groups have a considerable chance to sent their representatives 
into the Diet. If al districts were single-member districts， the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party has a fair chance that it can hold overdominating majority in the 
Diet. In this unique political election system and under the current political culture 
in Japan， the issue of reapportionment does not arise as a single most crucial 
element. 
The second factor is a close connection between the representative and the 
people represented. In Japan， the election districts are marked by a municipality's 
boundary line because of the belief that the connection between the representative 
and those represented should be maintained. The necessity of districting based on 
the traditional municipal boundaries is generally supported by the courts and 
commentators as well. There has been， therefore， no serious attempt to redraw the 
district lines or to challenge the districting practice in the court. Although the courts 
and commentators disagree about the degree to which it justifies deviations from 
population equality， the connection appears to be important for preventing partisan 
gerrymandering.124 
The third factor is the attitude of Japanese courts， especially the Supreme 
Court. Under the current judicial f，おorm庇 u
122. See Fortson v. Dorsey， 379 U.S. 433 (1965); Whitcomb v. Chavis， 403 U.S. 124 (1971); White v. 
Regester， 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Wise v. Lips∞mb， 437 U.S. 535 (1978); City of Mobile v. Bolden， 446 U.S. 55 
(1980) (at large election); Rogers v.Lodge， 458 U .S. 613 (1982). Difficulty of challenging the dilution of voting 
strength is well illustrated in Brown v. Thomson， 462 U.S. 835 (1983)ーInthis case， the Supreme Court upheld a 
maximum population variance of 89%，トto-3.2，because a plaintiff chose to challenge dilution of his voting 
strength， and ilot inequality in the right to vote itself. See Blacksher & Menefee， From Reynolds v. Sims to City 
of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?， 34 HAST. L. J. 1 
(1982); Butler， Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to ElectionStructures: DUution and the Value ofthe Right 
ω Vote， 42 LA. L. REV. 851 (1982); Butler， Reapportionment， the Court， and the Voting R啄htsAct: A 
Resegretation of the Political Process?， 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1984); Jordan， Taking Voting Rights Seriousか:
Rediscoνering the Fifteenth Amendment， 64 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1985). 
123. See Bickerstaff， supra note 44， at 607. 
124. The United States courts and commentators have not solved the issue of racial as well as partisan 
gerrymandering. See Backstrom， Robins， & Eller， Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of 
Partisan Gerrymandering App!ied to Minnesota， 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121 (1978); Note， Geometry and 
Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act， 94 YALE. L.J. 189 (1984). 
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discrimination are relegated to the problem of reasonableness review. But this may 
be said about aI other areas of constitutionaI rights. The Supreme Court has not 
recognized the preferred position of politicaI or personal rights.125 1n this climate of 
stiong judicial restraint philosophy， itis almost impossibIe to expect the Court to 
review malapportionment with some rigor. 
FinaIIy， malapportionment is only one phase of aII the issues involving the 
election system in Japan. There is some “fixing，" especiaIIy in the ruraI districts， 
and， even in urban districts， many private companies force their employees to cast 
their own and their family members' votes for a particular. candidate which the 
companies support. The public may not be necessarily taking the right to vote 
seriously. Moreover， various restrictions have been placed on election campaigns， 
including a limitation of the campaign period and a prohibition of any campaigning 
prior to this period， a prohibition of door-to-door canvassing， restrictions on the 
pamphleting， posting of posters， holding of rallies， or using of sound-trucks and so 
forth. And apparentIy， the Japanese Supreme Court has consistentIy upheld these 
far-reaching restrictions on the constitutionaI right of politicaI expression and 
election campaigning. This insensitivity of the Diet， courts， and the generaI public 
toward politicaI freedom may suggest that ordinary citizens regard the eIection as a 
formalistic ceremony. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court has now made clear that the current apportionment statute is 
unconstitutional. AIthough the LiberaI Democratic Party proposed a so-caIIed 
six-plus-six-minus plan which would move six representatives from overrepresented 
districts to underrepresented districts， opposition errupted and the Diet could not 
reach an agreement in its 1985 regular session. Meanwhile， the 1985 census has 
turned out a striking resuIt that a maximum population variance is now 1-toづ.12for 
the House of Representatives.126 1n order to reduce maximum poulation variance 
to the below 1-to-3 IeveI， which has been assumed by the Court. to be the 
constitutionaI Iimits， the Diet has to revise the statute quite drasticaIIy.127 
125. See generally L.BEER， FREEDOM OF EEXPRESSION IN JAPAN: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE LAW， 
POLITICS， AND SOCIETY (1984); Boltz， ludicial Reνiew in lapan: The Strategy of Restraint， 4 HAST. INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 87 (1980). 
126. ASAHI SHINBUN， Dec. 27， 1985， at2 
127. The Liberal Democratic Part is now thinking of the ten-plus-ten-minus plan， a plan which adjusts the 
number of apportioned Representatives. However， there is some disagreem巴nteven within the party and it is 
not clear whether the Diet wil come up with a compromise during this year's regular sesion. 
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In any event， the reapportionment cases are， tothis date， the only holdings 
handed down by the J apanese Supreme Court which dec1ared the Act of the Diet 
unconstitutional in the context involving political rights. Although the issue is more 
subtle in Japan than in the United States， the 1egislative insensitivity toward 
political rights appears to necessitate more active judicial role. It is hoped that the 
reapportionment cases will contribute to the development of a theory of judicial 
review in Japan. 
